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Abstract—In recent years, noticeable progress has been made
in the development of quantum equipment, reflected through
the number of successful demonstrations of Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) technology. Although they showcase the
great achievements of QKD, many practical difficulties still need
to be resolved. Inspired by the significant similarity between
mobile ad-hoc networks and QKD technology, we propose a
novel quality of service (QoS) model including new metrics for
determining the states of public and quantum channels as well
as a comprehensive metric of the QKD link. We also propose
a novel routing protocol to achieve high-level scalability and
minimize consumption of cryptographic keys. Given the limited
mobility of nodes in QKD networks, our routing protocol uses
the geographical distance and calculated link states to determine
the optimal route. It also benefits from a caching mechanism and
detection of returning loops to provide effective forwarding while
minimizing key consumption and achieving the desired utilization
of network links. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate
the validity and accuracy of the proposed solutions.
Index Terms—Quantum Key Distribution, Quality of Service,
Routing Protocol, Real-Time Traffic
I. INTRODUCTION
DURING the 30 years since the discovery of the firstquantum protocol [1], quantum technology has grown
significantly and is rapidly approaching high levels of maturity.
The next natural step in the evolution of quantum systems is
to study their performance, suitability and convergence with
applications used in everyday life. Significant progress in the
development of quantum equipment has been reflected through
a number of successful demonstrations of QKD networks [2–
7] but without showing the clear suitability to assess how
such networks compete with their classical counterparts under
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real-life conditions and in real-time traffic. The traffic in
these networks was mainly considered with equal importance
and it was treated with same priority. While such approach
may be acceptable for some applications, it is not suitable
for voice, video and collaborative applications. Since not all
network traffic is equal, it should not be treated equally. Hence,
different applications may have different service requirements
with respect to quality of service (QoS). This paper addresses
the question of using real-time communication in QKD net-
works by considering QoS mechanisms. The primary goal
is to provide an adequate QoS model that includes traffic
classification and marking mechanisms, QKD link metrics
that can be used to accurately describe the state of the
network, and a scalable routing protocol that minimizes the
consumption of key material through equitable utilization of
network resources.
QKD networks differ from traditional networks in several
aspects:
• Although theoretical and pioneering results have been
published in the field of quantum repeaters and quantum
relays [8–10], in practice they remain unachievable with
current technology1[11, 13]. Therefore, communication is
realized in a hop-by-hop [2] or key relay manner [3, 14].
Both methods rely on the assumption that all nodes along
the path between the sender and the receiver must be fully
trusted, forming a trusted relay QKD network [2, 15, 16].
• Nodes are connected with QKD logical links, referred to
below as links, which employ two distinct channels: a
quantum channel, which is used for transmission of raw
cryptographic keys encoded in certain photon properties,
and a public channel, used for verification and process-
ing of the exchanged values. Each quantum channel is
always a point-to-point connection between exactly two
nodes [17], while public channels can be implemented
1The idea behind implementing quantum routers is to use quantum entan-
glement of photons to communicate over different quantum channels. In short,
it means that multiple particles are linked together such that the measurement
of one particle’s quantum state determines the possible quantum states of the
other particles. Even when the particles are separated by a large distance,
they still make up a joint quantum system. The fidelity of a quantum state
decreases exponentially with the distance of its qubits due to noisy quantum
channels [11, 12]. In addition, quantum memory is required to implement a
quantum repeater according to [9, 10]. Although implementations of quantum
memories exist, which can store a qubit for between several milliseconds to
one second or even more, this is still too short for practical applications.
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as any conventional connection which can include an
arbitrary number of intermediate devices [18].
• The key rate is interconnected with a length of optical
fiber such that a longer distance implies a lower key
rate due to absorption and scattering of photons [11, 19–
21]. Although key rates of 1 Mbps and above have been
achieved [5, 22–24], such solutions are limited to very
short distances. Therefore, both endpoints of the corre-
sponding link implement key buffers (storages) of limited
capacity, which are gradually filled at their maximum
key rate with the processed cryptographic key, referred
to below as key material, and subsequently used for
encryption/decryption of data flow [17, 25]. Key material
denotes the symmetric cryptographic keys that are gener-
ated during the QKD process, stored in buffers (storages)
and used subsequently for cryptographic operations over
user traffic.
• Without key material, cryptographic operations cannot be
performed, and a link can be described as temporarily
unavailable [15]. To provide information-theoretically se-
cure (ITS) communication, the key tends to be applied
with a One-Time Pad (OTP) cipher and authenticated
using an ITS message authentication scheme such as
Wegman-Carter when communicating over a public chan-
nel [26–28]. As a result, ITS communication requires
more bits of key material than the length of the secured
message [17]. The type of encryption algorithm used and
the volume of network traffic to be encrypted determines
the key storage emptying speed, referred to as the key
consumption rate. The key consumption rate denotes the
rate of key material being taken from buffers (storages)
and used for cryptographic operations. Similarly, the
charging key rate (or simply key rate) denotes the rate
of new key material generation, that is, the rate of adding
new keys to the buffers (storages) [3, 17, 29].
• To meet the requirement to bypass untrusted nodes, in
practice, QKD networks are usually deployed as overlay
point-to-point networks which exhibit selfish behavior,
acting strategically to optimize performance and resulting
in dynamic and unpredictable link performance [17, 25,
30–32]. Overlay networks use existing underlying net-
works in an attempt to implement a better service; one of
their most important features is the independence of the
path offered by Internet service providers (ISP).
This paper is organized as follows: Section II covers re-
lated work, Section III points out the significant resemblance
between QKD and ad-hoc networks, and Section IV defines
the requirements for providing QoS in QKD networks. In
Section V we propose a novel QoS model including a GP-
SRQ routing protocol. The simulation setup is presented in
Section VII, with Section VII-A presenting the evaluation of
obtained results. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Given the common assumption that all nodes along a path in
a QKD network must be fully trusted [15, 16], QKD networks
were mainly analyzed from two aspects: security and network
performance. The idea of passive eavesdropping, in which the
adversary may use eavesdropping not to extract information
but to redirect the data flow towards a node under their
control, has been analyzed in [33]. Following a similar idea,
stochastic routing has been proposed to avoid deterministic
routing which is used in traditional routing protocols [34, 35].
Game-theoretic techniques have been used to find an optimal
balance between interdependent service quality criteria with
distinct performance indicators [36].
QoS in QKD networks deployed previously has been largely
neglected, stating that it is somehow achievable without any
difficulties. Therefore, the Open Shortest Path First (OSPFv2)
routing protocol has been modified to use the amount of key
material as the routing metric while ignoring the performance
of the public channel [25, 37]. In [38], the author proposes
using unencrypted and non-authenticated communication for
the dissemination of OSPFv2 routing packets; this is simple
prey for an eavesdropper who is assumed to have unlimited
resources at their disposal, especially when passive eaves-
dropping is taken into account [33]. In [39, 40], unmodified
OSPFv2 was combined with reserving key material resources.
Considering the interdependence of the public and quantum
channels [41], reservation of key material resources does not
solve the problem of QoS since the routing path may be
inadequate for quantum channels.
III. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN QKD AND MANET
TECHNOLOGIES
The specific QKD issues and constraints described above
pose significant challenges in QKD network design. However,
by analyzing the characteristics of QKD networks, we note
similarities with Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET) [42–44].
First, we specify the main characteristics of QKD technology
from a simple point of view:
• QKD links, described above, due to features of quantum
channels, are always implemented in point-to-point be-
havior, and they can be roughly characterized by two fea-
tures: limited distance and key rate inversely proportional
to the distance [17]. Additionally, QKD links may become
unavailable when there is no enough key material or when
the public channel is congested [41]. Such behavior is
similar to Wi-Fi links which are limited in length and
where the communication speed depends on the user’s
distance from the transmitter.
• One of the main features of QKD networks is the absence
of a quantum repeater or quantum router in practice,
therefore communication is usually performed on a hop-
by-hop basis [13, 17].
In MANET, communication takes place on a hop-by-hop
basis and mobile nodes are typically powered by batteries,
placing special attention on energy-aware solutions. The nodes
connect themselves in a decentralized, self-organizing manner
with no authority in charge of managing and controlling the
network [43, 45]. The battery power in MANET nodes can
be easily linked to the amount of key material in QKD key
storages. Given the node without a power supply (empty
batteries) is not an active member of the network, the same
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analogy is valid for QKD networks where the node without
available key material cannot be used for data transmission.
The range limitations of wireless links can be mapped to the
limitations in the length of QKD links, while the absence of a
dedicated network infrastructure (such as a router) is common
to MANET and QKD. Here we recognize the significant
similarity between these two technologies, allowing us to
propose a new approach to addressing QKD network issues.
IV. QOS IN QKD NETWORKS
The specific QKD constraints described above lead to the
conclusion that this type of network provides weak support to
QoS.
A. QoS Models
1) Integrated Service and QKD Networks: The basic con-
cept of the Integrated Service (IntServ) model is per-flow
resource reservation using the Signaling Resource ReSerVation
Protocol (RSVP) before data transmission [46]. In our view,
the IntServ model is not suitable for QKD networks because
of the following:
• An inability to guarantee the reservation: when QoS is
provided in an IP network, an IP router has complete con-
trol over its packet buffers and the output link bandwidth,
and can directly schedule these resources. In contrast,
in an overlay network, the node cannot directly access
the available resources in the overlay path. It can only
rely on measurement techniques where high accuracy
cannot be guaranteed and it cannot directly control or
reserve resources in the underlying network. The only
thing that a node in a QKD network is able to do is to
guarantee resources of a quantum channel by reserving
key material in key storages. However, considering the
interdependence of public and quantum channels in a
QKD link [41], such reservation does not constitute any
gain.
• Signaling: RSVP is an out-of-band signalization protocol
which means that signaling packets contend for network
resources with data packets and consume a substantial
amount of scarce key material and network resources.
2) Differentiated Service and QKD Networks: Differen-
tiated Service (DiffServ) uses Differentiated Services Code
Point (DSCP) bits in the IP header and a base set of packet
forwarding rules known as Per-Hop-Behavior. DiffServ is
known as an edge-provisioning model and it does not provide
any QoS guarantees per se [47]. The application of DiffServ
in its original form is limited in a QKD network due to the
following:
• Edge router selection: existing QKD technology limits
the deployment of a QKD network to the metropolitan
scale2 [2, 3, 5, 6, 48, 49]. In such a network, it is
necessary to clearly define the edge routers which play a
key role in the processing of traffic.
2In 2014, a QKD system connecting the cities of Hefei-Chaohu-Wuhu
(HCW) in China with a total of nine QKD nodes was reported in [6]. Thirteen
QKD devices within nine nodes in total were employed to support the two
QKD networks and the intercity QKD link.
• Lack of Service Level Agreement: each network node
needs to comply with the rules for the classification
and processing of traffic of different priorities. However,
since the Service Level Agreement (SLA) concept is not
defined in a QKD network, it is questionable how nodes
of potentially different domains can negotiate traffic rules.
B. QoS Signalization in QKD Networks
In general, the QKD protocol which establishes a new key
material consists of six successive stages: a physical exchange
of quantum states between a pair of devices, extraction of the
raw key (sifting), error rate estimation, reconciliation, privacy
amplification, and authentication [50, 51]. Only the first stage
is performed over a quantum channel; all other stages are
performed over a public channel, resulting in communication
referred to as QKD post-processing. We propose an extension
of authenticated packets with signaling data which provides
an elegant way of tackling the problem of distribution of
signaling information without introducing additional traffic
overheads [52].
C. QoS Routing in QKD Networks
In our view, a routing protocol well-suited for operation
in dynamic QKD networks should meet the following main
design objectives:
• Reducing the consumption of scarce key material by
choosing the shortest path considering both channels of
the QKD link. The routing algorithm needs to find a
balance between the requirements, since a path that meets
the requirements of the public channel may not be suitable
for the quantum channel and vice versa [17, 41].
• Given that the main objective of QKD is to provide ITS
communication, routing packets need to be encrypted and
authenticated [17, 53]. This means that the number of
routing packets needs to be minimized to preserve scarce
key material.
• To prevent denial of service, it is necessary to minimize
knowledge about the utilized routing path by reducing the
broadcast of routing packets [33].
• The routing protocol should be scalable to different
network sizes.
• Due to a low key charging rate and overlay networking
mode, link interruptions are common in QKD networks.
Hence, the routing protocol should be robust enough to
find an adequate replacement path.
In general, routing solutions can be divided into three
broad categories: source, hierarchical and distributed rout-
ing. The performance of source routing algorithms relies on
the availability of precise link state information, while the
dynamic nature of QKD networks makes the available link
state information inherently imprecise. Given that the constant
maintenance of link state information is mostly done by peri-
odic flooding, this solution is inadequate for QKD networks.
Although several examples exist of hierarchical network orga-
nization [4–6], in our opinion such organization is not suitable
for QKD networks since nodes of upper hierarchical levels
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represent a potentially easy target for attack to disassemble the
network. In distributed routing, the computation of the path is
shared among network nodes on a periodic basis (proactive)
or only when a routing path is requested (reactive). Proactive
routing protocols mainly use the static update period time
for keeping routes up-to-date, which contradicts the dynamic
nature of QKD networks. Therefore, in overlay networks
reactive routing performs better in terms of efficiency and
stability than proactive routing [54, 55].
V. FQKD: A FLEXIBLE QUALITY OF SERVICE MODEL
FOR QKD NETWORKS
To overcome problems of providing QoS in a dynamic
environment, we present a flexible QoS model for QKD
networks (FQKD). Our model avoids a centralized resource
management scheme or reservation of resources mechanism.
Instead, we turn to a distributed approach to control traffic
loads by providing soft-QoS constraints without flow or ses-
sion state information maintained in support of end-to-end
communication. FQKD defines three roles for nodes in a QKD
network: ingress, interior and egress. Each node can take any
of these roles depending on the position in network flow. A
source node which sends data is referred to as an ingress
node. Interior nodes are nodes that forward data to the final
destination node which is referred to as an egress node.
Fig. 1. FQKD model. First, the incoming application package is
classified and forwarded to the routing protocol which contacts
the admission control to verify there are sufficient resources for
processing the data. If true, the packet is stored in the appropriate
waiting queue and encrypted before sending to the network. Arrows
denote communication between model elements and the flow of the
processed packet.
A. Provisioning and Conditioning
As shown in Fig 1, the FQKD model consists of a sender-
based classifier, waiting queues, local node-based admission
controller, crypto module and dynamic regulation of admitted
sessions at the MAC layer. The classifier is input at the
ingress node to distinguish between traffic classes by marking
the DSCP field in the IP packet header. FQKD distinguishes
between three traffic classes with corresponding DSCP values:
best-effort, real-time and premium class. For each class, sepa-
rate waiting queues are defined and processed by priority. The
packets are forwarded by interior nodes in per-hop behavior
associated with the assigned DSCP value.
Considering that nodes in QKD networks constantly gener-
ate new keys at their maximum rate3[25], before setting the
route, the routing protocol contacts the admission controller to
filter those links to its neighbors that have sufficient resources
to serve the classified network packet. The routing protocol
calculates the path and the packet is forwarded to the MAC
layer for further processing. Otherwise, if no available link
is found, the packet waits in the queue for reprocessing. In
FQKD, additional waiting queues are installed between the L3
and L4 ISO/OSI layer to avoid conflicts in decision making
which could lead to inaccurate routing. Suppose the queues
are implemented on the data link layer (L2) only, and suppose
that they are half filled with packets. Since the routing protocol
used the routing metric that at the time t1 of calculating
the route had a different value from the time t2 when the
packet came online in the queue to be served, it follows that
significant changes to the state of links in the time interval
∆t = t2 − t1 could occur, which can lead to inaccurate and
incorrect routing. Instead, by exploiting higher level waiting
queues, the packet for which the route is calculated will be
directly forwarded to lower layers and immediately sent to
the network. This implies the usage of one set of waiting
queues (set of three waiting queues for best-effort, real-time
and premium traffic classes) for all network interfaces. Using
queuing at the L2 layer is not excluded, but additional attention
is given to queues at a higher level due to the dynamic nature
of the network.
Fig. 2. Traffic processing in the FQKD model
Assuming the key rate is constant in time when the quantum
channel has a fixed length [17, 25], it is evident that the
3QKD nodes aim to generate as much key material as possible. Therefore,
nodes constantly generate traffic at the highest rate allowed by the network.
More information about the impact of public channel states on the intensity
of the key rate can be found in [41].
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key storage can be identified with the Token Bucket traffic
shaping mechanism as shown in Fig. 2. This simplifies the
view of the admission controller, which behaves as the traffic
conditioner. The volume of traffic over the QKD link is limited
by the amount of key material in key storage which is used
for encryption or authentication of data over that link. The
key material storage of link k between nodes a and b can be
represented using following parameters:
• The time measurement moment t,
• The average key generation rate rk , measured in bits per
seconds and used to indicate the charging rate of the
storage,
• The key material storage depth Mmax,k , used to indicate
the capacity of the storage,
• The current value Mcur,k(t), representing the amount of
key material in the storage at the time of measurement t,
where it holds that Mcur,k(t) ≤ Mmax,k .
• The threshold value Mthr,a,b(t) or simply Mthr,k(t) de-
scribed in more detail below,
• QKD is also known as Quantum Key Growing [56, 57]
or Quantum Key Expansion [58], since it needs a small
amount of key material pre-shared between parties (de-
noted with Mmin,k) to establish a larger amount of the
secret key material. This pre-shared key material is used
for QKD post-processing and authentication [28, 58].
The amount of key material over a time interval T depends
on the key generation rate and the available amount of key
material in the storage, and can be calculated using Equa-
tion (1). The average operational rate, that is the rate at which
packets can be served over an interval T , can be calculated
using Equation (2). As T → ∞, the operational rate Ak(T)
approaches the charging key rate rk .
Dk(T) ≤ rk · T + Mcur,k(T) − Mmin,k(T) (1)
Ak(T) = Dk(T)T = rk +
Mcur,k(T) − Mmin,k(T)
T
(2)
However, the overall amount of traffic data that can be
transmitted over link k in a time interval T can be calculated
by dividing the value obtained from Equation (1) and the ratio
Lk which is the quotient of key length used for encryption with
authentication and the length of the data message. Note that
for ITS communication, which usually involves the OTP cipher
and Wegman-Carter authentication, more bits of key material
than the length of the data message are required (Lk > 1) [17].
An incoming packet is served from the queue only if there
is enough key material in the storage. Otherwise, the packet
remains in the queue waiting for storage to be charged. The
length of the queue is limited and traffic-shaping algorithms
are in charge of packet management operations. To avoid
blocking work due to the lack of the key material used to
generate new key material, special attention is placed on the
categorization of the traffic. If storage stops charging, the
purpose of the link loses functionality. Therefore, the traffic
generated by the post-processing application has the highest
priority and is sorted in the premium queue. Only traffic from
post-processing applications can use the key material when
Fig. 3. Simple topology showing the calculation of Mthr : a) The
traffic is routed along the route a-b-c-e; b) The traffic is routed along
the path a-b-c regardless of key material depletion of link c-e; c)
Calculated Mthr values based on Mcur values of all links connected
to a given node
Mcur,k(t) ≤ Mmin,k while the traffic from the other two queues
is served only when Mcur,k(t) > Mmin,k .
The threshold value Mthr is proposed to increase the stabil-
ity of QKD links, where Mthr,k(t) ≤ Mmax,k . The parameter is
explained by considering the simple topology shown in Fig. 3
where node a needs to communicate with remote node e.
Suppose the routing protocol uses only information about the
state of its links with its neighbors. Then, assuming that all
network links have the same performance of public channels,
we consider only the state of key storages which are marked
next to links as shown in Fig. 3-a. Upon receipt of the packet
from node a, the routing protocol on node b selects path b-c
since the link b-d has a lower performance. However, if node b
does not consider the state of links that are more than one hop
away, the traffic may stuck on the link between nodes b and c
as shown in Fig. 3-b. To avoid such behavior, we propose using
the Mthr value. Each node i calculates value Li summarizing
the Mcur values of links to its neighbors and dividing it by
the number of its neighbors Ni using Equation (3). Then,
each node exchanges calculated value Li with its neighbors.
The minimum value denoted by Equation (4) is accepted as a
reference threshold value of the link.
Li =
∑Ni
k=0 Mcur,i,k
Ni
(3)
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Mthr,i, j = min{Li, Lj} (4)
As shown in Fig. 3-c, node b calculates Lb = 36.66, while
node c calculates Lc = 25. The threshold value of the link
b-c is set to Mthr,b,c = 25 and it is included in link metric
calculation as described in Section V-B. The higher the value
of Mthr , the better the state of links that are more than one
hop away.
B. QKD Link Metric
Popular metrics from conventional networks which describe
the state of the communication link cannot be adequately used
in QKD networks since they only describe the public channel.
Therefore, we propose new metrics that clearly define the
state of the QKD link taking into account its most important
features.
1) The Quantum Channel Status Metric: At the moment
of serving the packet, the remaining key material in the key
storage is the main factor contributing to the link’s availability;
this is because without key material, cryptographic operations
cannot be performed and secure communication over the link
is not possible. We use Equation (6) to express the state of
the quantum channel between nodes s and i, where Q f rac,s,i
is the ratio of the squared amount of key material at the time
of measurement (Mcur,s,i2) multiplied by the threshold value
(Mthr,s,i) and the cubed capacity of the key storage (Mmax,s,i3)
as defined by Equation (5). Q f rac,s,i is in the range [0,1] and it
highlights the current amount of key material on closest links
in relation to the amount of key material of links that are
further away, since more distant links are unreachable when
links to neighbors are unavailable.
Q f rac,s,i =
Mcur,s,i2 · Mthr,s,i
Mmax,s,i3
(5)
Qm,s,i = 1 −
Q f rac,s,i
e(1−Q f r ac,s, i )
(6)
Qm,s,i is the utility function associated with the key material
level of the link. Qm,s,i uses an exponential formula to address
the fact that the lower the amount of key material in the
storage, the more critical the situation, and the less time is
left for the routing protocol to react.
The value of Qm,s,i is normalized as a grade ranging from
0 to 1 as shown in Fig. 4, where a lower value means
a better quantum channel state. In the example shown in
Fig. 3-c, the routing protocol should favor the link b-d since
Qm,b,d < Qm,b,c .
2) The Public Channel Status Metric: Instead of using pop-
ular approaches from conventional or overlay networks [30,
59], we use meta-data of keys such as the time duration of the
key establishment process to effectively assess the state of the
public channel. We define Pm,s,i with Equation (7) to evaluate
the state of the public channel between nodes s and i where
Tlast,s,i is the length of time spent on the establishment of the
key material at the time of measurement and Tmaximal,s,i is
the maximum time that can be tolerated for the establishment
Fig. 4. Qm of link between nodes s and i for different values of
Mthr ; Mmax,s,i = 100
of the key. Tmaximal,s,i is calculated as the double value of the
average duration of key material establishment process in the
long run, denoted as Taverage in Equation (8).
Pm,s,i =
Tlast,s,i + ∆t
Tmaximal,s,i
(7)
Tmaximal,s,i = 2 · Taverage (8)
∆t is used to describe the freshness of the information and
is defined as the difference between the current time of the
measurement and the time when the Tlast,s,i is recorded. Note
that Taverage is not equal for all links of the network, since it
depends on the load of the network, types of quantum and
network devices, QKD post-processing application and the
state of the public channel4. The value of Pm,s,i mainly falls
in the range [0,1] where the lower value means a better public
channel state. Values greater than 1 indicate that the link has
a problem with establishing new key material and such links
should not be considered.
3) The Overall QKD Link Status Metric: Key material
depletion is not the same for all links since it depends on the
type of encryption algorithm used and the volume of network
traffic to be encrypted. For example, a QKD link between
nodes s and i having a low value of Qm,s,i may be suitable for
a network flow encrypted with less secure algorithms which
require less key material than OTP (such as the AES cipher),
but it may not be suitable for encryption using OTP. Thus,
factor α which reflects the balance between the requirements
is introduced in Equation (9) to compensate for this effect
using the utility functions of the quantum and public channel
4In practice, the QKD link employs three channels. The QKD quantum-
channel and the QKD distillation-channel are usually referred to as the
quantum channel and public channel, respectively. The third channel is known
as the (time-stable) synchronization channel and cannot be separated from the
quantum channel physically to two fibers, because it delivers time references.
From the perspective of higher network layers, the synchronization channel is
part of the key generation (growing) process. If the impact of this channel on
the entire process were to be considered, the signals in the synchronization
channel need to be sufficiently large so that even co-propagating classical
channels or spoiled signals are irrelevant and key generation is disturbed.
Such major non-synchronization would be reflected in the overall duration of
the key generation process, which is considered using Equation (7).
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in the [0,1] range where a lower value means a better overall
link state.
Rm,s,i = α · Qm,s,i + (1 − α) · Pm,s,i (9)
Parameter α takes the value in the [0,1] range; if the OTP
cipher is used, we suggest the value of α = 0.5. This means
that both channels of the QKD link are considered equally.
If the AES cipher is used, α can be set to a lower value to
put a greater emphasis on the public channel due to its lower
requirements for key material, depending how frequently it is
refreshed and the length of the AES key used.
VI. GREEDY PERIMETER STATELESS ROUTING PROTOCOL
FOR QKD NETWORK
Driven by the similarities between the MANET and QKD
networks discussed in Section III, we present the Greedy
Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol for QKD networks (GP-
SRQ). The main motivation for designing GPSRQ is to mini-
mize the number of routing packets and to achieve high-level
scalability by using distributed geography reactive routing.
We assume that all nodes know the geographical locations
of all other network nodes they wish to communicate with.
Therefore, there is no periodic flooding of the node location
details and we assume a location registration and lookup
service that maps the node address to a location. This paper
does not deal with implementation details of such a service,
but we assume it can be implemented using internal or other
communication channels [60]. As indicated in Section IV-B,
authenticated packets in QKD post-processing can be used
to effectively exchange information about the geographical
position of nodes. Although several experiments have been
conducted regarding mobile QKD networking [61–65], due
to the high sensitivity of quantum equipment to various
environmental factors5 and relatively low key generation rates
in free-space QKD links [23, 58, 67–69], in this paper we
assume that QKD networks are composed of static nodes
representing secure access points6. We follow the idea "the
greater the distance separating two nodes, the slower they
appear to be moving with respect to each other" outlined
in [70] to implement caching in GPSRQ, which is discussed
further below.
GPSRQ sets up a network without hierarchical organization,
which means that all nodes in the network are of equal
importance. Nodes do not exchange routing tables, which
significantly minimizes the consumption of scarce key material
and reduces the probability of passive eavesdropping [33].
Route selection, that is the decision about the next hop, is
made in per-hop behavior such that the packet is moved closer
to the destination based on the states of links in the local
environment and on the geographical distance from the node.
An eavesdropper is not able to intercept routing packets and
find out the exact route to the destination, since it is not known
5The key rate may vary due to humidity, temperature, stability of devices,
global radiation, pressure, dust, sunshine duration or other factors [17, 66].
6Low mobility within a geographic region or slow node movement are
supported as long as the service for distributing geographic locations of nodes
can accurately and safely distribute locations to all nodes in the network.
at which node’s network interface the packet will be forwarded
until the last moment. GPSRQ uses two packet forwarding
algorithms: greedy forwarding and recovery mode forwarding.
Fig. 5. Ingress node a which is surrounded by three adjacent nodes b,
d, and k, aims to communicate with the egress node g. In the absence
of a path over node b, node a writes in the internal cache that it is
not possible to route packets along the path a-b towards the region
marked with a circle of radius d(b,g)/2 with the center in node g.
Any further request for routing towards any node which is placed in
the defined circle region will be ignored over the route via node b,
and an alternative route needs to be found.
A. Greedy Forwarding
By definition, greedy forwarding entails forwarding to the
neighbor geographically closest to the destination. An example
of greedy forwarding is shown in Fig. 5, where ingress node
a which is surrounded by three adjacent nodes b, d, and k,
needs to communicate with egress node g. Ingress node a
forwards the packet to b, as the Euclidean distance between
b and g is smaller than the distance between g and any
of a’s other neighbors. Such greedy forwarding is repeated
on interior nodes and it stops when the packet reaches its
destination. GPSRQ aims to maximize network utilization
by using different paths for different traffic classes. It uses
Equation (10) to calculate the path to forward the packet:
Fa,g,v =
(
1 − β) · Ra,v + β · Gv,d (10)
where Ra,v denotes the state of link between source node a
and neighboring node v using Equation (9) and Gv,g repre-
sents the Euclidean distance between neighboring node v and
destination node g, for each node v which belongs to the set
Na of all neighbors of source node a, ∀v ∈ Na. All routes
towards the destination are sorted in descending order using
Equation (10) and the route with the lowest value is used.
GPSRQ uses parameter β with a value in the [0,1] range to
manage network utilization by choosing between forwarding
along the geographically shortest route or the route that has
the most available resources. We discuss simulation results for
different values of β in Section VII-A5.
Greedy forwarding relies on the knowledge of the geograph-
ical location and state of links to neighbors, which results in a
high level of network scalability. However, in some cases the
route to the destination requires forwarding the packet over
a neighboring node which is geographically further from the
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destination than the node which forwards the packet. In cases
when a local maximum occurs, an alternative recovery-mode
forwarding is used. To increase scalability and exclude routes
which do not lead to the destination, we propose a robust
caching mechanism to preserve key material consumption.
Consider the example shown in Fig. 5 where we further
suppose that link b-f is unavailable due to a lack of key
material. When node b realizes there is only one interface
available (the interface which was used to receive the packet
from node a), it marks a "loop" field in the GPSRQ packet
header and returns the packet back to node a. Then, node a
calculates the Euclidean distance d(b,g) between node b and
destination node g and writes in its internal cache memory that
it is not possible to route towards the region which is marked
with a circle of radius d(b,g)/2 and the center in node g along
the path a-b. Upon receiving any further requests for routing
towards the node placed in the defined circle region, node a
will ignore the route over node b and look for an alternative
route. The validity of cached record is set to time interval
defined using Equation (11):
Tcache = Tmaximal,b,g/2 (11)
where Tmaximal,b,g is defined by Equation (8). The overall goal
is to reduce the dynamics of the network topology changes
using the scalable cache mechanism. In Section VII-A6, we
discuss the impact of different values on cache validity.
After the cached record expires, the node is allowed to try
establishing the connection once again. In the event when
GPSRQ detects there is no neighbor closer to the destination,
it enters recovery mode.
B. Recovery Mode Forwarding
Recovery mode involves using the well-known right-hand
rule which states that the next edge from node k upon arriving
from node a is edge (k,j) which is sequentially counterclock-
wise to edge (a,k) [71]. However, for first forwarding, the
packet is forwarded along edge (a,k) which is counterclock-
wise to node a from line ag. The packet stays in recovery
mode until it reaches a node which is closer to the destination
than the node where forwarding in recovery mode started. To
avoid routing loops, the GPSRQ header contains information
about the IP address of the node at which the packet entered
recovery mode and the outgoing interface which was used
for first forwarding. If the loop is detected by analyzing the
packet header, the packet is returned to the previous node for
rerouting and adding a new entry to the node’s internal cache
memory. If the public channel of link j-i is unavailable, there
is no available path to destination g. Source node a forwards
the packet to node k which forwards the packet to node j in
greedy forwarding mode. Since link j-i is unavailable, node j
is not able to find any neighbor closer to the destination so
it enters recovery mode, sets the value of the field "inRec"
to 1, writes its IP address to the header field "recPosition",
writes the interface number which leads to node l in the "recIF"
header field and forwards the packet to node l since it is on
the first edge counterclockwise about j from the line jg as
required by the right-hand rule. Upon receipt of the packet,
TABLE I. GPSRQ packet header fields used in recovery mode
forwarding
Field Description
inRec Mode: Greedy or Recovery
recPosition IP address of the node where recovery mode started
loop Returning Loop indicator
recIF Interface used for forwarding in recovery mode
node l inspects the header and remains in recovery mode since
node j in which the packet entered recovery mode is closer
to the destination g. Then, the packet is forwarded to node
k which forwards the packet back to node j. When node j
detects its IP address from the header field "recPosition", it
adds a record to the internal cache memory stating that it is
not possible to reach destination node g via node l by adding
a record consisting of the triple: IP address of hop l, the radius
of circle region d(l,g)/2 and the value of the circle center which
is set to the location of node g. Given that there is no other
interface available, node j sets GPSRQ header field "loop" to
1 and returns the packet to node k which adds a record to its
cache memory stating that it is not possible to reach destination
node g via node j. Then, node k sets the field "loop" to 2 and
tries again with greedy forwarding where node j is excluded
as the next hop. The packet is forwarded to node l which
forwards the packet to node j. Since node j does not have any
other interface available, it will set the value of header field
"loop" to 1, and return the packet to node l which will add to its
cache memory a record stating that it is not possible to reach
destination node g over node j. The packet is returned to node
k and then it is returned to node a. This procedure is repeated
until a feasible path to the destination is found. Otherwise, if
no available path is found, the packet is gradually returned to
the source node which is allowed to discard the packet while
keeping updated records in the cache memory of other nodes.
C. GPSRQ Protocol Implementation
To make the routing operation easier, encryption and authen-
tication are performed on the data link ISO/OSI layer [17, 72].
However, in previously deployed QKD networks the QKD
header was transported unencrypted [73]. A denial-of-service
attack is possible if an eavesdropper is able to block high
importance packets such as routing packets or post-processing
operation packets which would disable the link [74] or divert
traffic to the node under an attacker’s control [33]. There-
fore, we propose using the QKD Command header which is
encrypted together with the packet payload (Fig. 6). Instead
of adding the GPSRQ header to the packet, which would
increase the amount of key used for encryption, values from
the GPSRQ header which are listed in Table I are rearranged
to the QKD header and QKD command header prior to
transmission. Upon receiving the packet, the values are moved
from the QKD header and QKD command header to the
GPSRQ header.
In typical multimedia communication protocols, excessively
delayed packets are not used for the reconstruction of trans-
mitted data at the receiver [75]. We propose the extension
of the QKD header by including Timestamp and MaxDelay
fields to carry the packet’s timestamp and maximum tolerated
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 9
Fig. 6. Packet encapsulation with the QKD header and QKD com-
mand header
delay, respectively. The values of these fields are written at the
ingress node, while the GPSRQ at the interior node checks the
values before forwarding the packet, including the previously
mentioned field "loop". If the value of the "loop" field is equal
to 2, the packet was in a loop which was later avoided and
marked in the internal cache in the previous nodes, so no
action is taken against the packet. If the value of the "loop"
field is equal to 0, it means that the packet was not previously
in the loop. Then, GPSRQ checks whether the delay of the
packet, which is calculated as the difference between the
current timestamp and the Timestamp value, is greater than
the MaxDelay. If this is true, GPSRQ sets the "loop" field
to 1 and returns the packet to the previous hop which will
result in adding a new entry to the internal cache in previous
nodes as mentioned earlier. The function of the Timestamp and
MaxDelay fields is similar to the Time-to-Live (TTL) field in
the IP header of conventional networks, but with the aim of
minimizing the consumption of scarce key material in QKD
network.
VII. SIMULATION SETUP
To ensure simulations are independent of the topology or
characteristics of any specific network, random graphs were
constructed. Random network topologies were generated using
the Waxman model [76] which is recommended for small and
medium size networks which include locality aspects such as
QKD networks [2, 6, 48]. Additionally, the Waxman model
corresponds to the requirement for the implementation of QKD
networks without hierarchical multi-plane organization [77]
since it spreads nodes randomly on a grid and adds links
randomly, such that the probability Pe of interconnecting two
nodes in a single plane is parameterized by the Euclidean
distance separating them, as defined using Equation (12):
Pe(u, v) = Θ · exp−
d(u,v)
Ω·Λ (12)
where d(u, v) is the Euclidean distance between nodes u
and v, Λ denotes the maximum possible distance between
two nodes where 0 < Ω,Θ ≤ 1. The parameter choices are
constrained to assure Pe(u, v) ∈ [0, 1]. Each simulation was
repeated four times for random network topologies, with the
same number of nodes, and with random values of the initial
amount of key material in key storages. We evaluated GPSRQ
(β = 0.6; Taverage = 5) against OSPFv2 which was used
in previously deployed QKD networks [17, 25, 38–40], and
against DSDV which was used in our previous work [74]. The
simulation was performed using the QKD Network Simulation
Model (QKDNetSim) [78] to deploy GPSRQ and DSDV while
NS-3-DCE v.1.9 was used to deploy the OSPFv2 routing
protocol [79]. We used the BRITE topology generator to
generate random topologies according to the Waxman model,
since it is supported under NS-3 and the source code is freely
available [80]. NS-3-DCE and QKDNetSim were set to share
the same seed file to generate random values which enabled us
to use the same random topologies with the same configuration
values in QKDNetSim and NS-3- DCE. Simulations included
static networks with 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 and 70 nodes which
were randomly placed in a rectangular region and connected to
QKD links with the following settings: minimal amount of key
material 1 Mbyte; maximal amount 100 Mbyte; initial amount
randomly generated in the [0.5, 25] MByte range; maximal
bandwidth of the link set to 10 Mbps; charging key rate set to
100 kbps with the charging key period of seven seconds. The
Waxman router model was used with the following parameter
values: m = 2; Λ = 100; Ω = 0.4; Θ = 0.4; The first node was
set as the source of traffic, while the last randomly placed
node was set as the destination. The source node generated
UDP traffic with a 1 Mbps rate and fixed packet size of
512 bytes which were encrypted using OTP and authenticated
using VMAC with a 32 bit authentication tag [26–28]. The
duration of the simulation was 150 seconds, while the capacity
of waiting queues per device on the L2 and L4 layers (used
for GPSRQ only) was set to 1000 packets. The parameters
not given here are the default parameters of QKDNetSim and
NS-3-DCE.
A. Simulation Results and Evaluation
Although GPSRQ can achieve valuable results on non-
planar graphs, one of the drawbacks of GPSRQ is the large
consumption of key material in non-planar networks since ge-
ographical routing cannot quickly determine the shortest path
towards the destination which leads to unnecessary forwarding.
It is, therefore, advisable to convert non-planar graphs into
planar graphs in which geographic routing protocols can be
effectively used. Instead of using the heuristic to exclude
the intersecting edges [81], we modified the BRITE random
topology generator to generate random planar Gabriel Graphs7
(GG) which are defined as follows: "An edge "An edge (u, v)
exists between vertices u and v if no other vertex w is present
within the circle whose diameter is the Euclidean distance
d(u,v)" [82, 83].
1) Routing Protocol Overhead: Table II shows the routing
protocol overhead, measured by the number and summed sizes
of routing packets sent network-wide during the simulation for
GPSRQ, DSDV and OSPFv2. OSPFv2 is a widely deployed
link-state routing protocol which uses the periodic Link State
Announcement (LSA) flooding mechanism to update link-state
databases describing the network topology [84]. By default,
OSPFv2 floods LSA update information every 30 minutes and
it exchanges Hello packets to establish and maintain a neigh-
bor relationship every 10 seconds. If a node does not receive
a Hello message from a neighbor within a fixed dead interval
7The BRITE random generator with Gabriel Graph module is available at
https://bitbucket.org/mickeyze/brite-planar-graph
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TABLE II. The number and sizes of generated routing packets
GPSRQ DSDV OSPFv2
Nodes Number ofPackets
Sum of Packet
Sizes (MByte)
Number of
Packets
Sum of Packet
Sizes (Mbyte)
Number of
Packets
Sum of Packet
Sizes (MByte)
10 1740 0.097 4832 0.417 1594 0.149
20 4256 0.238 41 k 3.208 5522 0.628
30 6638 0.372 115 k 8.582 11 k 1.422
40 7896 0.442 142 k 11 13 k 1.829
50 9996 0.56 283 k 20 18 k 2.618
60 12198 0.684 294 k 23 27 k 3.866
70 14804 0.831 604 k 44 36 k 5.468
of time which is set to a default of 40 seconds for point-
to-point networks, OSPFv2 modifies its topology database
entries to indicate that the neighbor is unavailable. DSDV is
a proactive routing protocol which periodically broadcast its
routing table to its neighbors (every 15 seconds by default).
In addition, DSDV uses triggered updates when the network
topology suddenly changes. If periodic and triggered updates
occur in a short period of time, the values may be merged
and only the periodic update will be performed [59, 85]. In
contrast, GPSRQ relies on the knowledge of the geographical
position and state of links to neighbors, which provides a high
level of network scalability. As such, it periodically exchanges
only Mthr packets defined in Section V-A every time a new
key material is stored in key storages; the value was set
to seven seconds in our simulations. It is important to note
that DSDV and OSPFv2 exchange their routing packets using
UDP, while GPSRQ exchanges Mthr values using TCP, so
Table II includes all packets including TCP SYN, TCP ACK
and TCP FIN. We performed several simulations where Mthr
was set to 5, 15, 20 and 30 seconds besides the exchange of
Mthr every time new key material is added to key storage.
The data showed the same values, letting us conclude that a
single exchange of a Mthr value in a QKD post-processing
period is adequate for the smooth operation of GPSRQ. In
our simulations, values from GPSRQ packets were moved into
the QKD command header as described in Section VI-C, while
DSDV and OSPFv2 packets were sent using the standard QKD
header [17]. Table II shows that GPSRQ consumes the lowest
amount of key material for cryptographic operations in routing
packets, while Fig. 7 shows that GPSRQ consumes the greatest
amount of the available key material, but for securing data
traffic as seen from the PDR value (Section VII-A2).
2) Packet Delivery Ratio: The Packet Delivery Ratio
(PDR), calculated as the ratio of received and sent application
packets, is used to assess the effectiveness of the routing
protocol within the specified simulation environment. Fig. 8
shows that GPSRQ is able to successfully find an available
route to a destination when compared to OSPFv2 and DSDV.
Due to the large value of the dead interval, OSPFv2 is not able
to react quickly to the changes in network topology which
results in a reduced PDR value. DSDV exchanges routing
packets more often; this returns a higher PDR value, although
it is still significantly lower than GPSRQ. It is important to
note that in some simulation scenarios PDR could not reach
100% because it depends on the network conditions as defined
by random values, such as the initial amount of key material
in key storages. However, using the same seed files ensures
Fig. 7. Average Key material consumption
Fig. 8. Average Packet Delivery Ratio
identical network conditions for all tested protocols.
3) Path Length: Fig. 9 shows the average number of hops.
Data shows that GPSRQ recognizes paths to the destination
which are not visible to DSDV and OSPFv2. More specifically,
GPSRQ with the detection mechanism of returning the loop
increases the number of forwarding instances, but due to
scalable caching, GPSRQ is able to find the shortest feasible
path to the destination.
4) Time Delay: Our results show that the scalable caching
in GPSRQ has a significant impact on the average delay. As
shown in Fig. 10, values are significantly lower when com-
pared to DSDV and OSPFv2 due to the active measurements
of link states and detection of returning loops to exclude those
links that do not lead to the destination. The average delay for
GPSRQ does not notably increase with the number of nodes,
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Fig. 9. Average number of hops
Fig. 10. Average delay
leading us to the conclusion that GPSRQ supports network
scalability and robustness.
Fig. 11. Scaled average number of hops and scaled average delay for
various values of β (beta) from Equation (10).
5) The impact of GPSRQ β parameter: GPSRQ uses Equa-
tion (10) to balance between the geographically shortest path
and the path with the best performance. To show the impact
of parameter β, we conducted simulations on static networks
with 30, 40 and 50 randomly placed nodes, changing the
values of β. Fig. 11 shows that parameter β which is used
in greedy forwarding has a significant impact on the number
of hops. Considering that GPSRQ implements recovery mode
as a side algorithm which constantly seeks to forward packets
to the destination using the right-hand rule, there are no
significant differences in the PDR value for different values
of β. However, β directly affects the number of hops to
the destination in greedy forwarding, which results in an
increased delay and overall consumption of key material.
Although a neighboring node may be geographically closer
to the destination, routing without taking into consideration
link performance (β = 1) results in a returning loop and an
increased delay. On the other hand, routing without taking
into account the geographical distance forwards the packet
further from the destination (β = 0). However, with support
from recovery mode, the packet reaches its destination in an
increased number of hops and with a significantly greater
delay. Intuitively, different classes of traffic should be served
with different values of β depending on the priority of delivery,
which makes GPSRQ a flexible tool for traffic management
and effective utilization of network resources.
Fig. 12. Scaled average number of hops and scaled PDR for various
values of Taverage.
6) Impact of Caching Mechanism: One of the key parame-
ters of GPSRQ is the number of samples taken for calculating
the average duration of key material establishment process in
the long run, denoted as Taverage in Equation (8). Taverage de-
fines the response time to variations of the public channel state
and it is used to determine the validity of entries in the GPSRQ
cache memory Tcache as defined by Equation (11). Taverage
affects the rate of emptying the internal node’s cache which
has a significant impact on the average delay. To demonstrate
the impact of this parameter, we simulated random networks
with 30, 40 and 50 nodes, changing the values of Taverage.
Fig. 12 shows that the average number of hops grows with the
Taverage since GPSRQ seeks alternative longer routes while
PDR reduces as the validity of entries in internal node caches
remains longer. In addition, we note that setting Taverage to the
value of the time interval it takes to establish new key material
(7 seconds in our simulations) results in a significant change of
obtained values. The addition of new key material, defined by
a small key charging rate, slightly changes the performance of
the link. Therefore, frequent changes of cache memory records
lead to an increased number of returning loops due to sudden
changes in the availability of links.
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Fig. 13. The influence of the caching mechanism on PDR.
Taverage = 5
We repeated the experiments with the cache mechanism
excluded, where Fig. 13 shows the comparison of the PDR
values. When the caching mechanism is turned off, the number
of returning packets (packets with the value 2 of the loop
field in the GPSRQ header) increases considerably. The key
material is consumed on returning packets instead of data
traffic which should be sent on the shortest path. Due to the
larger traffic volume, the overall consumption of key material
is substantially increased, which reduces the value of the PDR.
Additionally, a noticeable increase in delay was noted due to
longer routes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a novel QoS model and routing protocol
for QKD networks. The FQKD QoS model involves traffic
classification at the ingress node based on prioritizing traffic
into appropriate queues. It also implements additional waiting
queues at a higher network layer to adapt to the dynamic
nature of QKD networks. It defines specific metrics for public
and quantum channels, an overall QKD link metric and Mthr
values to learn about the state of links which are more than
one hop away. The GPSRQ routing protocol uses distributed
geography and reactive routing to achieve high-level scalabil-
ity. It is equipped with a caching mechanism and detection
of returning loops, enabling forwarding while minimizing
key material consumption. However, GPSRQ applications are
limited to planar topologies only since geographic routing in
networks with non-planar topologies are not able to quickly
determine the shortest path, leading to unnecessary forwarding
and increased consumption of scarce key material. Since QKD
networks are limited to metropolitan scales [2, 6, 48], and
previously deployed QKD networks were deployed on planar
topologies [2–6], we do not consider this restriction as a
critical deficiency. Our simulation results show that GPSRQ
outperforms most popular solutions in previously deployed
testbeds. This is reflected particularly by minimizing the aver-
age delay and increasing PDR, which are the key parameters
for operative use of the real-time application [86].
The main contribution of this paper is providing novel
metrics for determining the states of quantum and public
channels as well as the overall state of QKD links, and
providing a novel QoS model and routing protocol for QKD
networks.
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APPENDIX A
MODIFIED QKD HEADER AND QKD COMMAND HEADER
TABLE III. Modified QKD header - description of fields
Field Length Short Description
Length 32 bits Total packet length in bytes
Message ID 32 bits Message ID
e 4 bits Type of encryption cipher used
a 4 bits Type of authentication algorithm used
z 2 bits Type of compression algorithm used
v 2 bits Version
r 2 bits GPSRQ inRec indicator
l 2 bits GPSRQ loop indicator
Channel 16 bits QKD public channel ID
MaxDelay 16 bits Maximum tolerated time delay
Timestamp 16 bits Timestamp of the packet generationat the ingress node
Encryption Key ID 32 bits ID of key used for Encryption
Authentication Key ID 32 bits ID of key used for Authentication
Authentication-tag 32 bits Authentication tag
Payload - Data payload
Fig. 14. Modified QKD header and QKD command header
Table IV and Table III provide a short explanation of
all fields in modified QKD headers and QKD command
headers [17].
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TABLE IV. QKD command header - Description of Fields
Field Length Short Description
Protocol 16 bits Type of next header in the packet headers chain
Command 16 bits Key management sub-protocol operation command(LOAD NEW KEY and other.)
RecIF 16 bit GPSRQ recIf field
RecPosition 16 bit GPSRQ recPosition field
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